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Abstract
Recent research has revived Long’s ‘‘ecology of games’’ model to analyze how social actors cooperate in the context of
multiple political and social games. However, there is still a paucity of theoretical work that considers the mechanisms by
which large-scale cooperation can be promoted in a dynamic institutional landscape, in which actors can join new games
and leave old ones. This paper develops an agent-based model of an ecology of games where agents participate in multiple
public goods games. In addition to contribution decisions, the agents can leave and join different games, and these
processes are de-coupled. We show that the payoff for cooperation is greater than for defection when limits to the number
of actors per game (‘‘capacity constraints’’) structure the population in ways that allow cooperators to cluster, independent
of any complex individual-level mechanisms such as reputation or punishment. Our model suggests that capacity
constraints are one effective mechanism for producing positive assortment and increasing cooperation in an ecology of
games. The results suggest an important trade-off between the inclusiveness of policy processes and cooperation: Fully
inclusive policy processes reduce the chances of cooperation.
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Introduction
This paper develops an agent-based model of cooperation in
multiple public goods games (PGGs). The model operationalizes
Long’s [1] notion of an ‘‘ecology of games,’’ which recognizes that
humans are social animals that interact in many different social
settings. For example, an individual in a community may be
simultaneously involved in school, work, church, social organiza-
tions, and political groups. Membership in each institution is not
mutually exclusive, and some of the same constellations of
individuals may be in a number of institutions. The ecology of
games is relevant for collective and political decision making as
well, because political actors must divide their time among a wide
range of decision processes for any particular issue area [2].
Developing models that account for the ecology of games facing
individuals is thus an important goal for understanding complex
social phenomena.
Our model includes social processes and institutional arrange-
ments that endogenously structure [3] how individuals participate
in multiple games, and can cluster actors in ways that favor
cooperative strategies. Our approach builds on two families of
models that have been developed in the literature on multiple
games and cooperation: 1) models that rely on fixed spatial or
network connections (or fixed degree distributions) to structure
interactions [4–13]; and 2) models where game strategies and
network structures co-evolve on unipartite networks without a
fixed number of links [14–17].
We consider a third type of model, which features a bipartite
network of actors and games in which the actions of leaving
current games and joining new games are de-coupled. The
bipartite network is not equivalent to the unimodal networks
commonly used to study multiple game settings. The unimodal
projection of a bipartite network has edges that capture the
number of shared games, but does not account for heterogeneity
among games. For example, actors A and B might share two
games, one game with actor C and the other with actor D. A
unipartite project would treat the two interactions between A and
B as equivalent and ignore the potentially important consequences
of a different third player in each game. Our model also differs
from several mentioned above [5,6,9,12,14–16] in the use of
multiplayer (nw2) games.
We make an additional contribution by considering minimally
simple institutional mechanisms for assortment. Specifically, we
show that capacity constraints on the number of players allowed in
a single game makes it more likely that cooperative strategies will
interact together. Such simple institutional mechanisms may be
easier to implement than more complex institutional and
individual mechanisms for producing cooperation [18], including
punishment [19,20] and reputation [4,21]. Complex institutions
may incur a higher level of transaction costs that must be
subtracted from the overall social gains from cooperation. Hence,
from a comparative institutional analysis perspective, it is generally
preferable to choose simpler institutions that provide greater net
benefits.
The capacity constraint institution is not equivalent to Olson’s
[22] famous hypothesis about group size, which focuses on the
decreasing marginal returns of individual contributions to a public
good. In contrast, the capacity constraint mechanism limits group
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for cooperative individuals to associate at a rate higher than
chance [23,24]. The result thus generalizes to the multiple game
setting the finding from single game studies that positive
assortment and clustering of cooperative strategies is a necessary
condition for the evolution of cooperation [25,26]. We argue that
any institutional mechanism that promotes positive assortment will
have a similar result, and suggest comparative institutional analysis
should the balance the speed at which assortment occurs with the
costs of institutional design.
It is important to note that our model differs from dynamic
evolutionary models in which strategies compete for reproductive
success. Here, strategies are fixed, and we focus on institutional
mechanisms by which extant cooperators may assort. Two points
should be made about this. First, in classic evolutionary game
theory [26,27], a mean advantage for cooperators is a necessary
condition for cooperation to evolve. Second, an underlying
assumption of our model is the capacity for a large amount of
social reorganization to occur between generations of reproduc-
tion (or imitation). This has previously been shown to benefit
cooperation in evolutionary models [6,9]. It is therefore useful to
study the relative payoffs and social reorganization in a population
of fixed-strategy agents. Future versions of this model will more
explicitly explore the feedbacks between the time scale of social
reorganization and evolutionary strategy selection.
Methods
A Basic Model for an Ecology of Public Goods Games
The PGG is a common model for representing interactions in
which the group benefits from individual contributions, but
individuals do better by free-riding. The rational solution to a
single-round game is therefore to contribute nothing, though
positive contributions can be maintained by mechanisms of
reputation [4] or punishment [19,20]. In the absence of secondary
mechanisms, spatial clustering can promote cooperation in the
PGG with evolutionary replicator dynamics [4,7].
We consider a population of individuals each playing one or
more PGGs, such that individuals may have overlapping co-
players in different games. The games structure the interactions
between individuals, and that structure can change as individuals
leave and join games.
Individuals have fixed resources c~1 to contribute every time
step, and each agent either defects by failing to contribute to any
games in which the individual is participating, or cooperates by
contributing all of its resources, divided evenly among all the
games in which the individual is participating. In real-world
interactions, not every individual has the same resources, nor
would they necessarily contribute equally to all games. Our main
motivation for using fixed resources was to develop our initial
model using simple assumptions. The decision was also motivated
theoretically by the finding that fixed resources promote the
evolution of cooperation in agent-centered public goods games on
a heterogeneous network [7], and is also a common investment
heuristic [28].
After each round of game play, some individuals have the
opportunity to join new games or leave current games. When
joining games, they have information about how much a given
game paid out to its participants, but not what each player
contributed. When leaving games, individuals only know what
they personally received. Joining and leaving are independent, and
some games may become ‘‘dead’’ if all players leave.
The agent considers all games with positive payouts and
attempts to join one with probability proportional to its relative
payout. Agents may then attempt to leave a game. An example of
this aspect of the model dynamics is shown in Figure 1. The agent
considers all its current games, excluding any just joined, and
leaves the one with the lowest payout if and only if that payout is
less than or equal to the individual’s contribution to that game. In
other words, individuals only leave games that don’t yield positive
returns. The process is continued until an equilibrium is reached in
which all movement is stops, usually within a few hundred time
steps (see Figure S3).
Institutional Constraints
In addition to the basic model, we examine two institutional
constraints that may structure the ecology of games, which we call
budget constraints and capacity constraints. Budget constraints refer to
limitations on the number of games in which an individual can
participate, and may be conceived of as the limitations on a
person’s available time, capital, or cognitive resources.
Capacity constraints refer to limitations on the number of
individuals that can participate in a single game. Institutions may
have formal restrictions on membership numbers, such as a
limited number of seats on a board, or restrictions may be
informal, such as a maximum number that can effectively
communicate in a group.
Model Specifics
A population of N agents play pure strategies of cooperate or
defect, where f is the frequency of cooperators, and are initially
distributed among M public goods games. Budget constraints may
enforce a maximum number of games per player, m . Similarly,
capacity constraints may impose a maximum number of players
per game, n . Agents are initially placed in min(m ,c0M) games,
and placement ends if all games reach n  players.
Each time step, all active public goods games are played. The
per-agent payout for each game j is
pj~
r
nj
X
nj
i~1
si
mi
, ð1Þ
where r is the game production and si~c if i is a cooperator and
zero if i is a defector. Each agent then has the opportunity to try
and join a new game, with probability c, , where 0vcƒ1 is a
constant that determines the rate of agent ‘‘social mobility.’’
Individuals are restricted to games being played by a current co-
player, which represents the fact that information about the
existence of social opportunities spreads through networks [29].
The agent considers all games with positive payouts and attempts
to join one with probability proportional to its relative payout.
Agents then attempt to leave a game, again with probability c
(Figure 1). The agent considers all its current games, excluding any
just joined, and leaves the one with the lowest payout if and only if
that payout is less than or equal to the individual’s contribution to
that game. In other words, individuals only leave games that don’t
yield positive returns. The process is continued until an
equilibrium is reached. Our results are averaged from 100 runs
of each condition, and unless otherwise stated, we used values of
r~2:5, N~100, M~100, c0~0:1, and c~0:1.
Results
Our results focus on the relative cooperator payoff, defined as the
average payoff to cooperators divided by the average payoff to
defectors at equilibrium. Cooperators have an advantage when the
relative cooperator payoff is greater than one. Without constraints
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all agents were playing all remaining active games. The payoffs
were equivalent to a single public goods game, in which
cooperators are heavily exploited by defectors. Figure 2 shows
the relative cooperator payoff at equilibrium under capacity
constraints and budget constraints. Severe budget constraints
allowed cooperators to do slightly better than in the unconstrained
model due to defectors’ inability to invade all games, but
cooperators still dramatically underperformed relative to defectors.
Capacity constraints, on the other hand, allowed cooperators to
Figure 1. Example model dynamics. Player contributions (cooperators only) to each game are indicated in blue at the end of the links connecting
players to games, with r~2:5. Each public goods game (green pentagons) pays out pj to each of its players, as indicated in white. Players may then
attempt to join or leave games. Cooperator-heavy games are much more stable. For illustrative convenience, in this example none of the agents
shown join a new game, and all agents are allowed to leave the games which are shown. For the individuals playing games not shown in the figure
(grey links), it is assumed that either those agents were not chosen to attempt to join or leave this turn, or that they were unable to join any new
games and that their offscreen games all yielded payouts greater than their contributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g001
Figure 2. Relative cooperator payoff at equilibrium under capacity constraints for varying values of c, and budget constraints for
c~0:1 (inset). Only capacity constraints allow cooperators to outperform defectors, the threshold for which is indicated by the blue line at unity. The
red line indicates the single game attractor for the unconstrained model. Here, f~0:5, r~2:5, N~M~100. Values are averaged from 100 runs, error
bars are 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g002
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maximum group size increases.
Figure 2 alsoshows that the relative cooperator payoff waslargely
unaffected by changes in the propensity to join or leave, c, for low
values of n , but as n  increased, cooperators did worse for larger
valuesofc.Largern  translatedtomoreavailablegamestojoin,and
larger values of c provided defectors with more opportunities to join
available games with many cooperators before cooperators could
leave the games that connected defectors to the larger world. When
c and n  were large,the relative cooperator payoff could drop below
the value for when all agents were in all games. This was due to
negative assortment resulting from the high rate of leaving and
joining combined with the constraint that individuals could only
join games played by a current co-player. This is supported by the
fact that more games remained active for large values of c and n ,
indicating that agents were more likely to be ‘‘stuck’’ in undesirable
games. Our results were also robust for a wide range of system sizes.
The relationship between n  and relative cooperator payoff held for
all the values we tested, between 50 and 500 agents (Figure S3A),
though larger populations unsurprisingly took slightly longer to
reach equilibrium (Figure S3B).
Figure 3 shows the relation between capacity constraints and
game production, r, for c~0:1. When n ~3, relative cooperator
payoff increased with game production up to r~3. For rw3, the
game was no longer a social dilemma, since the best move was to
cooperate even if the other two players defected. This led
cooperators to stay in games in which all other players were
defectors, and thus decreased their relative payoff. For n w3,
relative cooperator payoff did not increase monotonically with r,
in contrast to many previous public goods models
[8,10,11,13,16,30]. This is because larger values of r increased
the overall agent payoff, leading to potential decreases in the
minimum number of cooperators required for cooperators to stay
in a game. Even though cooperators now did better in those games
than with lower r, the fact that they stayed rather than left
decreased their relative payoffs. In real systems, the equivalent of
the game production will likely vary between institutions, further
complicating analysis. Still, the take-home here is that larger
returns on investments may also permit more freeloading [31].
The essential intuition of the capacity constraints result is that
positive assortment is driven by the exiting process. Cooperators
leave games with too many defectors, and stay in games with
enough cooperators so that they get a positive return on their
investment. Defectors, in turn, stay in games until all cooperators
have left. With capacity constraints, defectors are unable to enter
games with a cooperator majority, since no one will ever leave
those games. Thus, at equilibrium, cooperators will mostly be
found in games in which they constitute the majority. In games of
this type that still contain defectors, however, defectors still
outperform their co-players. This advantage to defectors, then,
must be outweighed by the influence of cooperator-only games, in
which cooperators receive their maximum payoff, and defector-
only games, in which defectors receive zero payoff. When game
sizes are limited, cooperators can cluster safely together, while
defectors are occasionally stranded without any cooperators to
exploit. This point is illustrated by Figure 4, which shows the
average number of players per active game at equilibrium. For
n ƒ7, almost all games are at capacity. This corresponds to the
maximum n  for which cooperators outperform defectors on
average (Figure 2). For larger maximum game sizes, defectors
more successfully occupy active games. As a result, fewer games
are desirable for cooperators, which also leads to higher levels of
cooperator flight and fewer active games at equilibrium (Figure
S2).
Cooperator Frequency and Excess Assortment
In our model, the frequency of strategies does not change.
Hence, the global frequency of cooperators, f, is a free parameter
in the model. Figure 5A shows the relative cooperator payoff
under capacity constraints for varying values of f. The payoff
advantage to cooperation was not a monotonic function of global
cooperator frequency: cooperators did best, relative to defectors,
when in the minority, at frequencies close to 0.4 (Figure 5A). This
Figure 3. Relative cooperator payoff at equilibrium under
capacity constraints for several values of the game production
r. Here, f~0:5, c~0:1, N~M~100. Values are averaged from 100
runs, error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g003
Figure 4. Average number of players per active game at
equilibrium under capacity constraints. For n ƒ7, most games
are full to capacity. For larger values of n , defectors are better able to
infiltrate games, making fewer games desirable for cooperators.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g004
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flee games in which defectors have too strong a presence. If there
are enough games available, cooperators will only be found in
games where they have a majority presence. In such games, any
defectors will still be able to exploit the cooperators. Thus,
cooperators only win out in the end if the games in which they are
exploited are outweighed by the effects of the cooperator-only
games and the defector-only games. Figure 6 illustrates this point
by showing the number of active games with each possible within-
game cooperator frequency for some example runs with n ~5.
Cooperators tended to do best when there were enough
defectors in the population to force the defectors into many
defector-only games, where defectors received zero payoff.
Maximizing both cooperator-only and defector-only games is
equivalent to maximizing the degree of positive assortment in the
population, the extent to which like strategies tend to cluster
together. A useful measure [32] for this is the excess assortment, aE,
which is the average observed assortment,
aO~
1
N
X
i
1
mi
X
j
n
(same)
j
nj
 !
, ð2Þ
minus the expected assortment,
SaT~f 2z(1{f)
2: ð3Þ
Here, j sums over all games played by individual i, and nsame
j is the
number of individuals in game j who play the same strategy as i.
Figure 5B shows that the excess assortment was maximal when
cooperators represented slightly less than half the population, and
that excess assortment corresponded quite well to the relative
cooperator payoff. Further analysis showed strong correlations
between excess assortment and relative cooperator payoff on
either side of the maximum assortment (Figure 7). We ran linear
regressions on the aggregate results from n ~f3,5,7,9,10g, and
found R2~0:756 (pv:0001) for fƒ0:4 and R2~0:671
(pv:0001) for f§0:4. Some additional sensitivity analyses may
be found in the Supporting Information (SI) Text S1, and in
Supporting Figures S1, S2, S3, and S4.
Discussion
As a broad generalization, network and institutional structures
that endogenously produce positive assortment will promote
Figure 5. Average relative cooperator payoff (A) and excess assortment (B) at equilibrium as a function of the global cooperator
frequency. Cooperator success is highly correlated with the ability of cooperators to assort at a level beyond that predicted by chance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g005
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social games and endogenous and dynamic network structures, an
important question can be phrased as: How can we get positive
assortment in an ecology of games?
Our model suggests that capacity constraints are one effective
mechanism for producing positive assortment and increasing
cooperation in an ecology of games, while individual budget
constraints are not sufficient to promote cooperation. Previous
work [32] has shown that positive assortment can occur when both
types of actors flee defector-heavy patches, and that limitations on
patch capacity promote positive assortment. We show this to be
the case in the context of an ecology of public goods games, and
that these mechanisms may be used to promote cooperation.
Capacity constraints allow cooperators to assort and prosper in
the absence of complex individual or institutional machinery. Such
simple institutions may be preferred over more complex
institutions with high transaction costs [34,35], including sanc-
tioning mechanisms[36]. However, incorporating more complex
strategies, network processes, and institutions into the ecology of
games framework will be an important area for future study
[4,9,19,21,37,38] (see Text S1). From a comparative institutional
analysis perspective, it is important to analyze the effectiveness of
different types of institutions for promoting cooperation, especially
when transaction costs vary across institutional arrangements.
These findings have important implications for social and
political organization in complex societies. Political theories of
democracy promote inclusiveness as a normative goal. The norm
of inclusiveness is also being promoted in many modern policy
processes that rely on ‘‘collaborative’’ decision-making [2,39,40].
But the requirement of positive assortment creates a challenge for
the promotion of cooperation, because it relies on the exclusion of
defecting strategies and selective sorting, rather than extending
invitations to everyone. Such empirical implications are, of course,
recognized in social animals that use ostracism. Our findings
suggest further empirical research on positive assortment mech-
anisms in real-life settings. Informal norms that promote positive
assortment may conflict with formally promoted principles of
inclusiveness in democratic societies.
In the course of a run of our model, games and individuals may
become isolated. Over a longer time scale than that considered
here, isolated groups of individuals would compete with one
another [15–17]. The consideration of evolutionary dynamics, in
which the relative fitness of isolated groups are compared, will be
an important area for future research.
It crucial to recognize that political and social institutions rarely
exist in isolation. Outcomes in nearly every social system are a
product of individual decisions in multiple games, and analyzing
one game at a time risks incorrect inferences. Our model of
cooperation in an ecology of games pits the individual’s interests in
one game not only against those of the other players in that game,
but also against those of the individuals in all his other games,
including himself. In the model presented here, the agents are very
simple, playing pure strategies without adaptation, memory, or
other complex mechanisms. These features can clearly be
Figure 6. Example time courses under capacity constraints (n ~5) showing the frequency of within-game cooperator frequencies
for several values of f. Cooperators tend to leave games where they are in the minority. Overall cooperator success, where the relative cooperator
payoff is greater than one, is a balancing act in which the games in which they are exploited by defectors are countered by their success in
cooperator-only games as well as the loss incurred by defectors in defector-only games.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g006
Figure 7. Relative cooperator payoff is highly correlated with
the ability of agents to assort by type. This scatterplot relates the
averages from across all tested cooperator frequencies, for a range of
capacity constraint conditions (n ~f3,5,7,9,10g). Both excess assort-
ment and relative cooperator payoff increase with cooperator
frequency up to about f~0:4 and then decrease. Coupling between
excess assortment and relative cooperator payoff is basically linear both
above and below this threshold frequency, but at different rates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019.g007
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framework for the theoretical analysis of a variety of processes in
an ecology of games beyond the public goods game. Models that
consider the ecology of games are vital for advancing our
understanding of complex political and social processes.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Additional analyses.
(PDF)
Figure S1 Average number of games at equilibrium under
capacity constraints for several values of c. As defectors can more
easily follow cooperators games and so by chase them out, the
number of active games decreases. For these runs, f=0:5,
M=N=100, r=2:5.
(TIF)
Figure S2 The more games there were initially, the greater an
opportunity agents had to drop them. This was particularly the
case for low values of n*, where the ability to keep defectors out of
cooperator-heavy games was most present.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Effects of system size on relative cooperator payoff (A)
and average time to equilibrium (B). For these runs, N=M. Our
results scaled very well, being little effected by a change in system
size. For small systems, when N=M=50, the system occasionally
exhibited long transient cycles, with some cooperators continu-
ously leaving and joining games in response to realized payoffs,
and leading to an increase in time to equilibrium in the data (B).
(TIF)
Figure S4 Relative cooperator payoff was unaffected by the
population size, as long as the number of available games changes
correspondingly.
(TIF)
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